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Abstract  
The teeming literature on transitional justice policies and peacebuilding suggests that 
regional organizations are veritable platforms for advancing transitional justice policies for 
attaining a relatively peaceful and justice-compliant society. The recognition of 
institutionalized transitional justice processes and the growing emphasis on the role of 
regional organizations has led to the undervaluation of non-traditional regional 
organizations. This paper examines the utility of such non-traditional regional bodies such as 
the Pan African Youth Union and Afrika Youth Movement in promoting effective transitional 
justice policies that will culminate in the creation of a culture of peace amongst African 
youth. The study analyzes and compares the history, structure, practices, and projects of 
these organizations to demonstrate a movement away from traditional liberal institutionalism 
in peacebuilding processes. 
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Introduction 
The development of liberal institutionalism, which advocates for the role of international 
institutions to bring cooperation amongst member states; as seen in the philosophies of 
Woodrow Wilson (1918); John Mueller (1986); Robert Keohane (1986); and Francis 




Fukuyama (1992), have cemented the nexus between the state and its institutions to the ideals 
and values of liberal democracy. The structures, institutions and principles of such forms of 
government percolate down to the manner in which governance, economics, society and 
politics is organized, conceptualized and practiced (Eagles, Holoman & Johnston, 2004). 
That is how the state, as an institution, is also perceived. It is thus, not states or institutions 
that are bad but rather, the interests which individuals take to them. This framework of 
understanding the intersection between individuals and institutions influences practice of 
peace and justice over the decades as well as the approaches underpinning the use of 
transitional justice systems in conflict-affected societies in recent times.  
Transitional justice refers to the methods in which countries or communities emerging out of 
conflict and repression, address systemic and historical human rights violations. Popular 
methods include truth commissions, institutional and societal reforms, as well as reparations. 
The aim of each method is create a situation in which the mechanisms and dynamics that 
created, perpetuated or allowed the violations to take place, never happen again. 
Today, the ambit of transitional justice is formulated, discussed and operationalized within 
institutions such as formal judicial systems; international or regional expert committees and 
international, regional and domestic policies. At the time of its institutional conception, 
transitional justice was viewed as an element of a process of democratization where it 
included the idea of the “rule of law” for the transformation of post-conflict societies. 
Transitional justice included truth commissions; “criminal sanctions, non-criminal sanctions, 
and treatment and compensation of victims” at the domestic level (Schabas, 2011: 2).  




As the idea of transitional justice and liberal institutionalism proliferated, the international 
arena adopted it into its priority areas, and as a result, defined what it meant as a universal 
concept. The 2010 Guidance Note on transitional justice issued by Ban Ki-moon, the then 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, outlines that the normative foundation for 
transitional justice was to be governed by the Charter of the United Nations, the modern 
international legal system which includes international human rights law, international 
humanitarian law, international criminal law and international refugee law (United Nations, 
2010:3). It is within these frameworks that the rights and duties about the rights to justice; 
truth; reparations; and the right to guarantee non-recurrence of violations, acquire centrality 
in transitional justice (United Nations, 2010: 4) 
This progression of recognition for transitional justice led to its adoption across such thematic 
areas as development which remains a central component of various development agenda 
from the past Millennium Development Goals as well as today’s, Sustainable Development 
Goals (Aguirre & Pietropaoli, 2008; Carranza, 2008; De Greiff & Duthie, 2009; International 
Development Law Organization 2014). Recognized internationally, the nexus between 
development and transitional justice has filtered down to regional organizations, for instance, 
the African Union and its youth policies (Matlosa, 2015; African Union, 2016). In effect, this 
has further reinforced the link between development and liberal democracy and ultimately, 
transitional justice. Opening the 56th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, the Director for Political Affairs of the African Union Commission, 
Khabele Matlosa affirms that: 
One of the five clusters of the African Governance architecture is the Human 
Rights and Transitional Justice cluster. This cluster provides a unique 




opportunity to strengthen capacity and deepen our understanding of issues of 
human and peoples’ rights, democracy and governance, which constitute our 
African Shared Values (Matlosa, 2015). 
The above notwithstanding, the seeming consensus that transitional justice is inherently 
linked to liberal democracy by academics, governmental organizations and policy makers 
limits the scope of the concept to specific cases of transitional justice. It additionally, 
excludes the recognition of power in the analyses of these cases - that is; what are the 
underlying interests of parties and who does transitional justice serve (Hansen, 2011; Anand, 
2016). More specifically, critiques of transitional justice assert, that the operationalization of 
the concept has manifested itself as new forms of colonialism, where which cases are tried; 
what reparations are given and who is part of transitional justice mechanisms is seen as 
intrinsic to the legitimacy of the concept itself and the method employed (Hansen, 2015; 
Dersso, 2013). All transitional justice institutions (either by states or regional organizations) 
were thus, created with a historical, political and legal background, where power and interest 
are central to the operationalization of justice.  
Against this background, this paper explores the utility of two non-traditional regional 
bodies, namely: The Pan-African Youth Union (PYU) and Afrika Youth Movement (AYM) in 
promoting effective transitional justice policies towards creating a culture of peace amongst 
African youth. It draws on the existing literature and the increasing activities of the youth 
population in stressing the contributory values of these bodies to the evolution of transitional 
justice policies in Africa. The paper reinforces the stance that the traditional regional 
organizations are structured and guided by the assumption that the individual gives its rights 
to the governments which constitute the organizations and through them, the individual’s 
interest are accommodated. 




The youth organizations, classified as non-traditional, differ from the traditional state created 
and run institutionalized regional organizations notably, the African Union (AU); East 
African Community (EAC); Sothern African Development Community (SADC); Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS). These regional entities, comprise of 
sovereign states, are directly influenced by the politics and structures of their member 
countries. On the other hand, non-traditional regional bodies could be considered as entities 
with the potentials of challenging the ‘traditional’ manner in which transitional justice has 
been conceptualized and practiced in the previous decades. However, the structure, policies 
and practices of these organizations tend to be top-down in the sense that they are elitist. 
Accordingly, the paper considers non-traditional organizations particularly, the Pan-African 
Youth Union and the Afrika Youth Movement as youth-led organizations or bottom-up 
organizations with the latent possibilities of evolving into a more inclusive transitional justice 
practices, given their critical role. In that context, this paper questions the doctrinal 
acceptance of liberal institutionalism towards the attainment of a more holistic and 
sustainable transitional practice and system. More broadly, the paper interrogates the role 
youth play in transitional justice processes?  The two youth organizations, Pan-African Youth 
Union and the Afrika Youth Movement chosen for this analysis represent a spectrum of 
regional youth organizations on the African continent.  
The Pan African Youth Union (PYU) and the Afrika Youth Movement 
(AYM) as Pivots for Delivering Transitional Justice in Africa 
The African Youth Charter considers youth or young people as all those that fall within the 
ages of 15 to 35 years (African Youth Charter, 2006). This Charter was endorsed on July 2, 
2006, by the African Union Heads of States and Governments meeting in Banjul, Gambia but 




it entered into force on August 8, 2009. The African Youth Charter is a political and legal 
document. Indeed, it is a strategic framework for the African States. The Charter gives 
direction for youth empowerment and development at continental, regional and national 
levels. Part of its objectives is to strengthen and consolidate efforts to empower young people 
through meaningful youth participation and equal partnership in driving development agenda 
for Africa.  
As stated in the preamble of the African Youth Charter, Africa’s greatest resource is its 
youthful population with whose active and full participation, the continent will be able to 
overcome the difficulties that lie ahead of it (African Youth Charter, 2006). The youth 
constitutes a significant proportion of Africa’s population. (“Youth Demographics Analysis - 
African Institute for Development Policy” 2018) stated that nearly 19% are between 15-24 
years old. Their collective voice and actions under auspices of various bodies such as the Pan 
African Youth Movement and the Afrika Youth Movement, is critical to the continent’s 
shared position to the world on various issues affecting the entire continent. The contributory 
value of the activities of these bodies to the society they represent is therefore, capacious 
enough to shift transitional justice processes away from the dogmatic or routine acceptance of 
liberal institutionalism as an instrument for the attainment of a more holistic and sustainable 
transitional justice practice and system. 
Historically, the African youth have played a central role in struggles against oppression, 
injustice, violence and governance. Kwame Nkrumah, by the age of 37 was planning the 
1945 Pan-African Congress; Abdul Gamel Nasser was 38 when he became President of 
Egypt; Nelson Mandela and Patrice Lumumba were all in their youth when they led 




movements against colonialism (Lopes, 2013). Nonetheless, the African youth are presently, 
marginalized economically, socially and politically (Lopes, 2013). In South Africa, the youth 
were an intrinsic part of the struggle against apartheid (“The Youth Struggle” 2015), and 
therefore they were a vital asset and target population in the country’s Truth and 
Reconciliation process. Education was hence an important strategy that the government 
employed to reverse the effects of years of violence and marginalization (“Youth and 
Transitional Justice: The Power of Education” 2014). However, the youth were not part of 
decision-making processes despite playing an active role throughout the apartheid era. 
Over the past century, Africa has experienced rapid population growth. The continent has the 
most significant percentage of the young population (Zinkina & Korotaye, 2014; Alhendawi, 
2017:7).  Half of the population in most African countries are under 25 and life expectancy is 
not beyond 50 years in some states (Zinkina & Korotaye, 2014; United Nations, 2015). The 
graph below demonstrates that youth in Africa ranging from 15-34 years of age are 
consistently over ten years a larger population than that of 35+ years. This means that the 
collective activities of these youth under the auspices of various international fora or bodies 
remain critical to the future growth of the continent as a whole. This underlies as well as 
reinforces the often-cited dictum that “the youth of today are the leaders of tomorrow”. What 
this implies is that the future of nations or Africa lies in the youth. In that regard, what 
African youth represents or stands for and their collective experiences and activities remain 
crucial to the peaceful co-existence of nations, continents and the world at large.  
Graph 1: Youth Population versus Adult Population Distribution in Africa, 2006-
2017




Source: Adapted and updated from United Nations World Population Prospect. DESA/Population 
Division. Retrieved form https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DataQuery/ on August, 4, 2017. 
Notwithstanding of the rising impact of the youth population and the establishment of the 
African Youth Charter recognizing the importance of youth in society, youth participation in 
the public sphere and key decision-making institutions remain limited (Wamucii, 2012). Thus 
far; youth projects and policies have been predominately dominated by the state and adult 
population both the governmental and civil society level (Wamucii, 2012). As a result, young 
people resort to alternative spaces and institutions to embark on societal re-engineering and 
policy changes. The Pan African Youth Union and Afrika Youth Movement are two of such 
organizational areas youth leverages on to articulate their position in public affairs.  
This is not to enunciate that governments are total gatekeepers against youth involvement in 
governance or public affair. There is an increasing consciousness of the importance of youth 
participation in public affairs among nations and international organizations. The youth 
constitute an integral part of the United Nations (UN) focus, such that every aspect of its 
operations now pays attention to the youth issues. One evidence in that direction is that the 
United Nations for the first time, held the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 




Youth Forum which brought together youth Ministers from 129 members states (Alhendawi, 
2017: 6). The forum is the first of its kinds to offer space to facilitate dialogue as well as a 
platform to assemble, set norms and rouse one another to do more. 
Similarly, about 60 indicators out of the total 230 in the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) pertains to youth development (Alhendawi, 2017: 7). The reason is that there is 
significant input from young people in the processes leading to the SDGs, which not in the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The Human Rights Council has also, for the first 
time, adopted a Security Council Resolution 2250 on youth peace and security. This 
resolution urges member states to increase youth representation, to give the youth a greater 
voice in decision-making at the local, national, regional and international levels (UN Security 
Council, 2015).  
Issues of youth policy and development have also become critical areas of attention on the 
agenda of important conferences and meetings at the level of the national governmental and 
international organizations. As such, there is today a fund for youth peacebuilding set up by 
the Peacebuilding Commission (United Nation, 2016). At the national governmental levels, 
states are beginning to resort to affirmative actions towards adequate youth representation. In 
Kenya, for example, twelve parliamentary seats are special interests reserved for youth, 
among other representatives to be nominated by political parties, which Article 100 of the 
2010 Kenyan Constitution give effect to (Kenya, 2010; Kuwonu, 2017: 8).  
Other examples youth affirmative action includes in Morocco where the electoral law 
reserved 30 elective seats for candidates below forty years; Rwandese where the National 
Youth Council is entitled to have two elected representatives in the Chamber of Deputies; 




while in Uganda, 5 seats are reserved in its parliament for youth (Kuwonu, 2017: 9). In 
Nigeria, President Muhammadu Buhari’s has signed to law the “Not-too-young-to-run Bill, 
2017” which was passed concurrently by the House and Senate of the National Assembly in 
2017. The new law Act amends sections 65, 106, 131 and 177 of the Nigerian 1999 
Constitution by reducing the age qualification for running for the office of the Senate from 35 
to 30; House of Representatives 30 to 25; President from 40 to 35; Governor 35 to 30; and 
State House of Assembly 30 to 25 respectively (Onwughalu & Obiorah, 2018:6). In essence, 
the new parliamentary Act is a youth-inclusive legal framework that is fundamental in 
galvanizing the process of mainstreaming the youth in the political processes.    
Together, all these initiative points out the importance of young people in contemporary 
society. The adoption of the African Youth Charter by member states of the African Union 
and declaring 2009 to 2018 as the ‘‘Africa Youth Decade’’ all demonstrate the importance 
the continent attaches to her your people. Nevertheless, much of what African states consider 
as youth development initiatives are about the provision of employment and quality 
education, instead of active participation in representative politics, governance and the policy 
decision-making processes.  
African youths are still under-represented in various spheres of public life. Many African 
youths have had unique experiences of the effects of human rights violations (International 
Centre for Transitional and justice- ICTJ, 2014). A lot of youth have suffered first-hand 
abuse, for example, forced recruitment, torture, displacement or sexual assault leading to 
severe physical and psychological harm without having the opportunities of being exposed to 
appropriate transitional justice delivery mechanisms. Some have also lost their guardians 




through killings, unlawful detention or disappearances, while others have suffered the trauma 
of separation and loss of support without receiving commensurate redress for their suffering.  
The mechanisms for most transitional justice implementation processes are ill-designed and 
as such, not best-fitted for dealing with the scenarios previously highlighted (Bercovitch & 
Jackson, 2009). Occasionally, the approaches in use are perceived as being alien and, in most 
cases, non-representative of all that have suffered victimization. The approaches to 
transitional justice are usually: externally motivated, influenced and financed; conceptually 
and theoretically faulty; politically constrained; ethically problematic; not bottom-up and as 
such lacking the principal elements crucial to their successful implementation (Bercovitch & 
Jackson, 2009; 161-164). These challenges typified many transitional justice processes in 
Africa including the experiences in South Africa (1996); Liberia (2005-2015); Togo (2009); 
Uganda (1984-1994); Sierra Leone (2002-2004); Nigeria (1999); and Kenya (2008), to 
mention a few (International Centre for Transitional and justice- ICTJ, 2017). 
In particular, transitional justice policies have been criticized for lack of legitimacy because 
they were not developed by African states and therefore to not take into account the cultural 
dynamics specific to the African context (Hansen, 2015). This criticism prompted the need to 
create an African transitional justice policy. Transitional justice efforts in Africa are 
therefore, guided by the African Union Transitional Justice Policy Framework. It 
consolidates different practices, lessons, and norms on transitional justice mechanisms. The 
framework highlights main priority areas; impunity, human rights violations and injustices in 
countries which emerge from conflict. It additionally, recognizes the importance of the youth 
as a vulnerable population but does not mention them as critical players in transitional justice 




program and policy formation. This underscores the imperative for examining the potential of 
youth organizations in promoting effective transitional justice systems in Africa.  
To start with, the Pan African Youth Movement was established at the Pan African Youth 
Conference on April 26th, 1962 in Conakry, Guinea (Bahru, 2010: 29). Its aim was the 
mobilization of youth in Africa to take part in the liberation movements that were happening 
across Africa. It was a continental organization comprised of the youth branches of political 
parties and liberation movements. The headquarters were held in Conakry up until 1967 until 
it was moved to Algiers, Algeria (Shillington 2005: 1186). As a body of coordinating youth 
activities, the Pan African Youth Movement organized “youth festivals, leadership training 
seminars, and voluntary services”(Ewumbue-Monono, 2009: 169).  
However, due to Cold War politics at the time, the organization’s congresses were branded as 
socialist propaganda. Therefore, there was little formalized activity of the organization until 
1963 when the Organization for African Unity was established and the Pan African Youth 
Movement was adopted as a specialized agency. When the Organization for African Unity 
later changed to the African Union in 2002, the Pan African Youth Movement was replaced 
in November 2003 by the Pan African Youth Union. The organization’s headquarters are 
currently in Khartoum, Sudan.  
The Pan African Youth Union holds a special status within the African Union as the 
organization which is accountable for National Youth Councils all over the continent. It 
receives financial support from members of the African Union as stated in the 2011 Malabo 
Declaration (African Union 2011: 6). The Statute of the Pan African Youth Union amended 
and adopted by the 2nd Congress in Brazzaville, Congo from July 29 to August 1st, 2008, 




outlines the legal and political framework for the organization. It notes that youth have 
always contributed to the emancipation and development processes of society and is therefore 
central to the struggle for “Peace, Democracy, and the sustained Development of Africa” 
(Pan African Youth Union Statute, 2008: 2). The Mission of the Pan African Youth Union is 
to foster “Unity, Peace, Democracy, Sustained Development and African Integration” (Pan 
African Youth Union Statute, 2008: 3).  
Structure of the Pan African Youth Union 
The work of the Union has predominately been that of coordinating the work of National 
Youth Councils across Africa. For instance, the National Youth Council of Nigeria has 
organized several projects on transitional justice. These include; sensitization workshops on 
Source: Adapted from the Revitalization Process of the Pan-African Youth Union, Progress 
Report, 2013. 




peacebuilding, conflict resolution and voter education and a radio program called “Peace 
Flight” to addressed peacebuilding in Borno State.  
The roles of the National Youth Councils, which are part of the government machinery, are 
the organs of the Pan African Youth Union which carry out projects around the overall 
objectives of the organization. The reliance on state-sponsored and annexed organizations 
means that the National Youth Councils and consequently, the Pan African Youth Union are 
susceptible and reliant on domestic politics to carry out its regional mandate. As such; there 
are some National Youth Councils which are more active than others, depending on the 
political environment and resources of the specific countries. 
The Afrika Youth Movement is a Pan-Africanist social movement “that strives for the 
development, active participation and Leadership of African youth in the fight for social 
justice” (Afrika Youth Movement, 2017). It is “not an NGO that implements projects; we are 
a movement that provides the support, mentorship, networks and empowerment of ideas and 
solutions” (Ruano, 2017). It began on July 14, 2014, as a Facebook Group by Tunisian 
blogger and activist Aya Chebbi. Today the movement has over 5,000 active young Africans 
from 40 countries. Membership is on an individual basis rather than organizational. 
The movement aims to collectively change the reality of Africa by using tools such as social 
media (Afrika Youth Movement, 2017) and grassroots oriented projects to build a 
community-based youth movement that is actively engaged in the political, social and 
economic advancement of Africa. It is comprised of 7 Committees centered around, 
education; employment; entrepreneurship; gender; environment; sustainable development; 
governance; transparency; agriculture; peace and security (Ruano, 2017). They have 




organized and coordinated advocacy campaigns tagged, such as, #AfricaSmile which was a 
campaign to celebrate the diversity and positive stories of Africans around the continent and 
the #ILoveMyContinent which was launched by the Peace and Security committee to 
reaffirm commitment to peace. 
Both the Pan African Youth Union and the Afrika Youth Movement participated in 
international forums such as the 34th session of the Human Rights Council; ‘First session of 
the Forum on Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law’ held in Geneva from the 21st 
to 22nd November 2016 with the theme “Widening the democratic space:  the role of youth in 
public decision-making”. The Pan African Youth Union, represented by its President 
Francine Muyumba and the Afrika Youth Movement represented by its founder Aya Chebbi. 
The forum highlighted the importance of youth development as an indisputable fact and 
further noted that they seldom engage in transitional justice activities at the diplomatic or 
policy level. Hence, youths are, often viewed as perpetrators or victims of violence but not as 
peacemakers or peacebuilders. There is thus, a gap and a clear need to consider youths as 
being crucial to the pursuit of transitional justice and ultimately, peace, security and 
development. 
Regarding transitional justice, the forum recommends that:  
States should establish mechanisms for the sustainable, effective and 
meaningful participation of youth in peace negotiations, peacebuilding and 
transitional justice initiatives and processes. Special attention should be 
given to groups that are often disproportionately affected by conflict, such 
as young people with disabilities, internally displaced youth and refugees 
and young women and girls, to ensure their participation in peace 
negotiations and peacebuilding initiatives, including by creating safe spaces 
to raise their specific concerns. Youth-led initiatives that have proven to 
contribute to peacebuilding should be recognized, promoted and supported.  
The media should promote the positive role of young people in peace-




related initiatives, as well as disseminate successful stories of youth-led 
initiatives at the local level. (A/HRC/34/46, 2017: 14). 
Towards Grassroot Youth Mobilization for Transitional Justice  
Though these non-traditional regional bodies incorporate international membership, 
membership is optional for countries, even those within the same geographical contiguity. 
They also differ with the traditional regional bodies in terms of political and financial 
autonomy which they relatively lack but traditional regional bodies do enjoy.  These non-
traditional regional bodies are not standalone bodies but work in varying degrees as partners 
to conventional regional organizations. For instance, the Pan African Youth Union enjoys 
special status within the African Union and is currently supported by the African Union 
Youth Program; as well as serving as an advisory agency for the Youth Commission of the 
African Union (YouthPolicy.org, 2016).  
The above notwithstanding, they play bottom-up roles that are vital to international relations 
particularly, at the continental level. If explored, they could partly, facilitate the development 
and promotion of effective transitional justice policies that will be useful in creating a culture 
of peace amongst African youth. As peace movements, they serve as bodies and mechanisms 
for coordinating national youth activities at continental, regional and national levels by 
contributing to peacebuilding in Africa through bottom-up or grassroots-based approaches. 
Their actions, though highly within international relations spectrum, are thus, more 
communal-based and nationalistic in orientation and character, giving that national youth 
activities of various nations are what constitute their very initial foundation and focal point. 
Viewed from the prism of Pan Africanism, non-traditional bodies or peace movements, 
regardless of their nationalistic and yet international outlook, have mutual collective feelings 




in the significance of a continent seeking independence for its diverse cultures, traditions, 
civilizations and peace that holds it together. This can be articulated as a political ideology 
involving individuals and respective states identifying with one another and becoming more 
attached to their continent. Drawing from Clement Adibe’s reflections on the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), nationalism or continentalism in these 
continent-wide peace movements is characterized by a sense of collective identity that has 
been created and promoted by a common historical and ideological experience (Adibe, 2001: 
17).  
Both the Pan African Youth Union and the Afrika Youth Movement draw attention to the 
importance of creating a community of youth that responds to issues of injustice and which 
make statements of support to those that’s rights are violated. They also construct a narrative 
that situates the youth at the center of thematic areas that are linked to transitional justice. 
Furthermore, the foundational philosophy of Pan Africanism advocates for the creation of 
African solutions to African problems. More importantly, Pan Africanism also promotes the 
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